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roposed legislation called the 
Back to Work Incentive Act of 2003 
introduced a new model for customer 
choice among publicly funded 
reemployment services. The Bush 
administration recommended a two-year 
federal budget of $3.6 billion to provide 
each eligible unemployment insurance 
(UI) claimant a personal reemployment 
account (PRA) of up to $3,000. Personal 
reemployment account funds could be 
used for three things: 1) to purchase 
reemployment services, 2) as a 
reemployment bonus, and 3) as extended 
income maintenance for exhaustees of 
regular UI benefits. Personal 
reemployment account offers would be 
targeted to UI beneficiaries most likely to 
exhaust their UI entitlements using state 
Worker Profiling and Reemployment 
Services (WPRS) models.
If PRAs are enacted, core services at 
one-stop career centers would remain free 
to all customers, but PRA recipients 
wishing to use intensive, supportive, and 
job training services would be required to 
use account funds to purchase them from 
a qualified public or private vendor. 
Additionally, PRA recipients who return 
to work within 13 weeks of their UI claim 
date may receive the unused balance in 
the PRA as a cash reemployment bonus. 
Sixty percent of the balance would be 
paid upon reemployment with the
remainder payable after six months steady 
employment. Those failing to gain 
reemployment and exhausting regular UI 
entitlement could draw support payments 
from their PRAs at the rate of their 
weekly benefit amounts (WBAs).
The PRA proposal combines several 
employment initiatives in an innovative 
way, but legislation authorizing PRAs has 
not yet been enacted. However, the
PRA offers would be targeted
to UI beneficiaries most likely to
exhaust their UI entitlements
using state WPRS models
proposal remains active and has the 
president's continued support. The W.E. 
Upjohn Institute has investigated aspects 
of how the proposed PRAs would work 
under a grant from the U.S. Department 
of Labor. The Institute conducted PRA 
simulation analyses using a unique data 
set for the state of Georgia linking UI 
claims and employment services records 
(O'Leary and Eberts 2003). To be 
forward looking, our simulations used the 
new WPRS model now being 
implemented in Georgia.
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PRA Budgets and Service Prices
The proposed $3.6 billion for PRA 
enrollments over two years requires funds 
be distributed to states in proportion to 
their share of national unemployment. 
Based on 2002 unemployment figures, 
Georgia's share would be 2.37 percent, 
or $85.32 million. The proposal also 
requires that PRA funds be allocated 
within states in proportion to regional 
shares of state unemployment. Given that 
offers are to be targeted using WPRS 
scores to those most likely to exhaust 
their benefit entitlement, nearly all offers 
would be made to UI claimants in the top 
30 percent of the state WPRS distribution 
of claimant scores. Consequently, we 
focus our simulations on that group of 
claimants.
Since the simulation analysis required 
monetary values for services, 
hypothetical prices were based on 
statewide service expenditures, service 
usage rates, and relative valuations for 
services. Based on our sample for 
analysis, Table 1 summarizes imputed 
prices for services as well as usage rates 
during the two PRA relevant time 
periods: the first 13 weeks and the 
remaining 39 weeks in the UI benefit 
year. In addition to supportive and 
training services, Georgia one-stop 
centers offer five types of intensive 
services. The most popular intensive 
services among those potentially eligible 
for a PRA are customer service plan and 
counseling. The table shows that among 
those profiled, 18.9 and 20.3 percent of
claimants used these services during the 
first 13 weeks. The table further shows 
that the bulk of service use occurs in that 
earlier time frame. Relatively small 
proportions of UI claimants use either 
supportive or training services, which are 
imputed to be most costly.
PRA Simulations
Our simulations focus on estimating 
the average expected cost per $3,000 PRA 
offer, and the number of offers possible 
over two years given the budget. 
Estimates of these magnitudes are critical 
for states planning for PRA enrollment 
over a two-year cycle. The simulations 
also provide evidence on the pattern of 
service use, bonus receipt, and income
Relatively small proportions 
of UI claimants use either
supportive or training
services, which are imputed
to be most costly.
maintenance payments likely to result 
under PR As.
To span the range of possible 
responses to PRA offers, our simulations 
include a baseline of no change in 
behavior regarding service use and UI 
benefit receipt, as well as impacts 
shortening UI duration by 1 and 2 weeks. 
These alternatives encompass the range of
Table 1 Estimated Services Usage Rates and Prices for Intensive, Supportive, and 
Training Services among WPRS Profiled UI Claimants in Georgia, 
Program Year 2001
Up to 13 weeks After 13 weeks
Services
Hypothetical prices 
($)
Intensive services
Service coordination
Customer service plan
In-depth assessment
Counseling
Expanded workshop
Supportive services
Training services
0.5
18.9
0.1
20.3
0.4
1.7
2.7
0.2
4.6
0.0
5.1
0.3
0.6
1.8
356
356
712
712
712
1,068
1,424
Table 2 Sample Percentages by
Employment Status in PRA 
Time Periods among 
Recipients Profiled to be Most 
Likely to Exhaust UI Benefits
Employed 
in first 
13 weeks Employed after 13 weeks
Yes No
Yes
No
26.7 13.5
9.9 49.9
responses observed in the UI 
reemployment bonus experiments 
(Robins and Spiegelman 2001). The 
simulation grants a first bonus payment 
for UI duration of less than 13 weeks, and 
a second bonus payment when there are 
also positive earnings in the first and third 
quarters following the claim and at least 
$2,000 in earnings the second quarter. 
Under the proposal, a second bonus is not 
paid if reemployment services are 
purchased after a first bonus payment. 
Table 2 shows that for the baseline 
simulation, 26.7 percent of the sample 
could be paid both bonuses provided 
funds remained in the PRA after purchase 
of services while a total of 40.2 percent 
of those potentially offered a bonus 
appear to qualify for a first bonus 
payment. Since they did not gain 
employment during the first 13 weeks, 
58.8 percent of the sample would not 
qualify for either bonus but could use 
PRA funds for services or income support 
payments after benefit exhaustion.
If every UI claimant offered a PRA 
accepted, and if every recipient spent the 
entire $3,000 grant, then 28,440 offers 
could be made over two years with the 
Georgia budget of $85.32 million. 
However, it is unlikely that all account 
recipients will spend their entire grant. 
Table 3 summarizes the average cost per 
offer given the prices and usage pattern 
for services observed in Georgia. Since 
there is uncertainty about what elements 
of PRAs may emerge from current 
deliberations or future proposals, the table 
presents results for three combinations: 1) 
bonus, purchase of services, and
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Table 3 Average Cost per PRA Offer for Alternative Combinations of Features ($)
PRA scenario Baseline 1-week impact 2-week impact
Bonus, purchase services, and 
UI exhaustee payments
Bonus and purchase services
Bonus only with free services
2,475
1,452
1,040
2,515
1,491
1,086
2,551
1,528
1,131
exhaustee payments, 2) bonus and 
purchase of services, and 3) bonus only 
with free services.
The Average Cost of PRA Offers
The top row of Table 3 reports that 
offers with all three elements would cost 
an average of $2,475 in the absence of 
any behavioral response. If durations for 
those offered PRAs are 1 week shorter, 
the average cost per offer rises by $40; if 
the response is 2 weeks the cost rises by 
$76 per offer from the baseline. The 
increased cost results from more 
beneficiaries becoming employed soon 
enough to qualify for bonus payments. 
The average cost increases resulting 
from responses to the PRA offer are 
modest.
If the extended jobless benefits feature 
of PRAs is eliminated, the average 
baseline cost of a $3,000 account drops 
more than $1,000 to $1,452. Accounting 
for 1- and 2-week behavioral responses 
increases the average cost by $39 and 
$76, respectively.
The bottom row of Table 3 shows 
costs associated with simplified PRAs 
involving only a targeted reemployment 
bonus. Simulations for Georgia indicate 
that the baseline $3,000 bonus offer 
would cost $1,040 in payments, and if 
insured durations declined by 1 or 2 
weeks the costs would rise by $46 and
$91, respectively. Previous analysis of 
targeted reemployment bonuses 
suggested that cash offers as large as 
$3,000 would not be cost effective, but 
smaller offers could be cost effective 
while still encouraging quicker return to 
work (O'Leary, Decker, and Wandner 
forthcoming).
The Number of PRA Offers Possible
Table 4 translates the PRA average 
cost figures into estimates of the number 
of offers that could be made assuming 
100 percent acceptance of PRA offers. 
An 80 percent acceptance rate was 
observed in the Illinois bonus experiment, 
which required a formal acceptance of the 
offer (Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987). 
Assuming that acceptance is not 
correlated with factors systematically 
influencing the rate of spending from 
PRAs, enrollment estimates could be 
adjusted by a factor equal to the 
reciprocal of the take-up rate. Our 
simulations indicate that the baseline 
PRA with all three elements could be 
offered to 34,473 Georgia UI claimants 
over two years. That is about 17,000 per 
year, or about 6.3 percent of Georgia UI 
claimants based on 2001 data. The PRA 
proposal targets WPRS profiled claimants 
most likely to exhaust benefits who are 
initially eligible for at least 20 weeks of 
benefits, and 17,000 offers constitute
Table 4 Number of PRA Offers Possible in Georgia over Two Years for
Alternative Combinations of Features Assuming All Offers Are Accepted
PRA scenario Baseline 1-week impact 2-week impact
Bonus, purchase services, and 
UI exhaustee payments
Bonus and purchase services
Bonus only with free services
34,473
65,149
93,403
33,924
63,538
89,473
33,446
62,111
85,929
about 13 percent of this target group in 
Georgia. Even with a 1- or 2-week 
behavioral response, the Georgia budget 
would permit nearly 17,000 offers per 
year.
If the PRA included only the bonus 
and purchase of services, not the 
extended benefits feature, more than 
31,000 offers per year could be made 
with the Georgia budget regardless of 
the behavioral response. For offers that 
were simply $3,000 targeted bonuses, 
more than 43,000 offers per year could 
be made with the PRA grant to Georgia.
Additional Program Design 
Considerations
Our simulation results are very robust 
relative to the assumed service prices. 
Cutting service prices in half would 
increase the number of offers possible by 
only about 20 percent. However, there is 
uncertainty about how charging for
If the extended jobless benefits
feature of PRAs is eliminated,
the average baseline cost of a
$3,000 account drops more
than $1,000 to $1,452.
services would affect the pattern of 
services chosen.
Under what conditions would a PRA 
recipient either purchase services or take 
their chances and pursue bonus 
payments? To investigate this question, 
we identified the reemployment 
outcomes that would make a participant 
financially indifferent toward the 
following two extremes: 1) purchasing 
no services with the hope of receiving 
the full PRA amount in bonus 
payments, or 2) spending the entire 
PRA amount to purchase services with 
the hope of speeding up reemployment 
or receiving a higher reemployment 
wage. To spend the entire budget on 
services, the UI beneficiary must expect 
either earnings to be nearly 14 percent 
higher or that employment will occur at 
least 6 weeks sooner. Research on
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employment and earnings effects of 
employment services and job training 
suggest effects are more modest (Leigh 
1995). PR A recipients might therefore 
reduce use of services in hopes of 
receiving larger reemployment bonuses.
We also checked to see if $3,000 
would be sufficient to purchase the 
bundles of services chosen given the 
assumed prices. If no PRA money was 
spent on bonuses and all on services, 
about one-half of 1 percent of the UI 
claimants in our Georgia sample would 
have a budget shortfall. Among these
To spend the entire budget 
on services, the UI beneficiary 
must expect either earnings to
be nearly 14 percent higher
or that employment will occur
at least 6 weeks sooner.
claimants, the mean budget shortfall was 
$551 in the first 13 weeks and $637 
during the remainder of the UI benefit 
year.
The PRA proposal requires that the 
amount of the PRA be uniform 
throughout the state and not exceed 
$3,000. Since the UI reemployment 
experiments set bonus offers as multiples 
of the WBA, we simulated setting PRAs 
as 10 times the WBA, with a minimum of 
$1,500. The maximum WBA in Georgia 
is $300. This design would permit about 
15 percent more bonus offers, and it also 
may moderate the incentive for some 
claimants to accept low-paying jobs 
simply to qualify for the first bonus paid 
upon reemployment.
The UI reemployment experiments 
paid bonuses only after at least 16 weeks 
of continuous reemployment. In these 
experiments, the reemployment earnings 
of those offered bonuses were at least as 
high as the control groups. The timing of 
bonus payments under the proposed 
PRAs might yield a different impact on 
wages.
The proposed formula for PRA budget 
allocations to states and local service
delivery regions within states is 
determined by the estimated share of 
unemployment. This formula will yield a 
disproportionate share of PRA dollars to 
qualified UI claimants in states with 
relatively exclusionary UI eligibility 
conditions. The total unemployment rate 
exceeds the insured unemployment rate 
by a greater margin in such areas. Since 
PRAs are offered only to UI claimants, 
the allocation could more equitably be 
based on the state and local share of 
insured unemployment. Changing the 
allocation rule to be based on insured 
unemployment would not penalize states 
that have higher rates.
Summary
Economists have long touted the 
merits of incentives, pricing, and 
targeting in social programs, particularly 
reemployment programs. These features 
have been tried in demonstration 
programs, and some are now used in 
Individual Training Accounts and the 
WPRS system. However, all three 
features previously have not been 
combined in the same program. 
Simulations suggest that successful 
implementation of such a program 
requires an understanding of the possible 
responses by participants. Simulations 
also point to the range of behavioral 
responses necessary for PRAs to function 
well. While findings from past studies 
indicate that measured responses to 
reemployment bonuses and expected 
wage gains from services fall short of 
what is necessary for participants to 
choose services over the bonus, final 
assessment of PRAs awaits 
implementation or demonstration of the 
program.
For links to additional information on 
PRAs, visit http://www.upjohninstitute. 
org/pra.html.
Christopher J. O'Leary is a senior 
economist at the Upjohn Institute.
Randall W. Eberts is executive director of 
the Upjohn Institute.
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Institute Moves in to New Facility
Randall W. Eberts
I am pleased to announce the 
opening of our newly expanded 
and renovated facility. After 
nearly two years of planning and 
a year of construction, we moved 
into our new offices on October 
27. The new facility doubles the 
space of our main building, 
adding an additional 20,000 
square feet of new offices and 
meeting rooms, and totally 
renovates the existing building of 
similar size. Although we have 
two other buildings on our 
campus, we found over the past 
several years that we had 
outgrown our space. We had 
squeezed as many people in the 
main building as we could. When 
we moved into the original 
building in 1965, we had a staff 
of 14; when we moved out of the 
building to make way for 
construction, we had 34 
employees in that building and 
21 in our other two buildings. 
Obviously, it was time to expand.
Staff had considerable input into the design of the building and their workspace, and they are pleased with the highly functional space 
that resulted. Now we have additional office space to house visiting scholars and summer interns, a large conference room to hold 
seminars or small conferences, several meeting rooms, and an expanded library. We also have a state-of-the-art teleconferencing center.
The Upjohn Institute's new facility doubles the space of the original building, adding an 
additional 20,000 square feet. The building to the left is one of two additional Institute buildings, 
which are refurbished mansions that house various operations.
The construction process began in 
October 2002 and was completed 
one year later. The original 
building, constructed in a U-shaped 
configuration with a courtyard in 
the middle, was completely 
renovated and fully integrated with 
the new two-story addition.
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A spacious 
reception area 
welcomes 
visitors and 
opens into a 
two-story 
atrium with 
skylight, as 
shown in the 
bottom photo.
The large 
conference 
room allows 
ample room for 
seminars and 
guest speakers.
For those who have visited our Web site 
during the past year, you may have kept 
abreast of our progress in transforming 
our existing building.
The Institute grew out of Dr. Upjohn's 
concern about the well-being of workers 
who are displaced due to economic 
downturns. In 1932, he purchased a 
sizable parcel of land outside of 
Kalamazoo where laid-off workers could 
grow food for their families. This grand 
experiment of a land-based social safety 
net was replaced by the Unemployment 
Insurance system a few years later.
Today, the Institute has 55 employees 
working in two divisions. The research 
division, including 10 Ph.D. economists, 
analyzes the dynamics of the labor market 
and conducts evaluations of employment 
programs around the world. The 
employment management division is the 
administrative entity for the local 
Workforce Development Board, 
administering all federal and state 
employment programs for our part of 
Michigan. The marriage of research and 
operations makes the Institute a unique 
organization, and with this expansion and 
upgrade, we believe that we are better 
equipped to fulfill our mission of finding 
practical solutions to employment issues.
Natural light and open space 
contribute to the Institute's 
modern design. The two-story 
glass atrium offers a seamless 
view into the landscaped 
courtyard and a panoramic 
view of downtown Kalamazoo 
from the second floor.
Job Creation, Job 
Destruction,
and International 
Competition
Michael W. Klein
Scott Schuh 
Robert K. Triest
When job loss occurs in the U.S. 
labor market particularly in the 
manufacturing sector international 
competition 
invariably 
receives the brunt 
of the blame. 
Jobs, it seems, are 
being siphoned 
off overseas as a 
result of free 
trade agreements 
with nations that 
have eager, low- 
wage workforces. In fact, say the 
authors, this is only part of the story. 
At the same time jobs are being lost, 
other jobs are being created. Therefore, 
a more nuanced view of the effects of 
international competition is called for 
in order to truly understand its effects 
on the U.S. job market.
Klein, Schuh, and Triest offer such 
a view by presenting a picture of how 
the effects of international trade on 
employment in U.S. manufacturing 
industries vary widely. They explore 
the labor-market dynamics and 
adjustment costs associated with 
international factors, particularly the 
way fluctuations in exchange rates, 
overseas economic activity, and the 
altering of trade restrictions contribute 
to churning the simultaneous job 
creation among some firms and job 
destruction among others.
This book serves as the first step 
toward building a base of knowledge 
that should improve our understanding 
of, and policies toward, the effects of 
international competition on labor 
markets.
216 pp. $40 cloth ISBN 0-88099-272-7 / $17 
pbk. ISBN 0-88099-271-9. 2003.
New Books
Nonstandard
Work in
Developed
Economies
Causes and Consequences
Susan Houseman 
Machiko Osawa, Editors
Full-time, 
permanent 
employment has 
historically been 
the norm in the 
developed 
economies of the 
United States, 
Japan, and 
Europe. Yet in 
most of these countries, the fraction of 
workers engaged in nonstandard work 
(e.g., part-time, temporary, or contract 
positions) has increased in recent 
years, in some countries dramatically 
so.
The papers comprising this book 
reveal the considerable variation in the 
levels of growth in a broad set of 
nonstandard work arrangements while 
presenting a comprehensive view of 
how the nature of the employment 
relationship is changing within and 
among countries.
The international roster of 
economists, sociologists, and labor law 
experts who contributed to this volume 
draw on cross-country variations in 
economic conditions and institutional 
characteristics to explain why some 
arrangements have grown faster in 
some countries than in others and what 
this means for workers.
Overall, this book will be useful for 
anyone seeking to gain a better 
understanding of the trends in 
nonstandard work arrangements 
including factors influencing their size 
and growth, their impact on women, 
and their implications for employees' 
job security, pay, and benefits. 
520 pp. $70 cloth ISBN 0-88099-264-6 / $26 
pbk. ISBN 0-88099-263-8. 2003.
International
Trade and Labor
Markets
Theory, Evidence, and Policy 
Implications
Carl Davidson 
Steven J. Matusz
Davidson and Matusz set out to 
examine the impact of trade on the 
poor and unemployed by showing that 
there is much to be gained by
extending the 
traditional 
analysis of 
international 
trade to allow for 
labor markets 
characterized by 
workers whose 
labor-market 
experiences are 
punctuated by 
spells of involuntary employment.
To accomplish this, they develop 
models to investigate the impact of a 
variety of policies that are aimed at 
offsetting some of the costs of worker 
displacement caused by trade and trade 
policies. These models allow them to 
investigate the impact of trade on the 
poor both through its impacts on job 
opportunities and its impact on the 
distribution of income when 
unemployment is present. They are 
also able to explore how best to 
compensate those who are harmed by 
trade liberalization. 
145 pp. $40 cloth ISBN 0-88099-274-3 / $16 
pbk. ISBN 0-88099-273-5. 2004.
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